Your will can be ignored, say judges – Telegraph.
Actually, it might be phrased (verbatim from the judgment)
Parliament has entrusted the courts with the power to ensure, in the case of even an adult child, that reasonable financial provision is made for maintenance only
For the judgments in questionm, the Bailii references are: Ilott v Mitson & Ors  EWCA Civ 797 (27 July 2015) and the previous judgment of Ilott v Mitson & Ors  EWCA Civ 346 (31 March 2011).
The case centres around the unhappy tale of a mother (Melita Jackson) who, being bereaved whilst pregnant, had her only child, a daughter (Mrs Ilott). Mrs Jackson, died leaving a will that expressly excluded her daughter from benefit, leaving all her estate to animal charities, despite there being no obvious connection or affection for animals or such charities
There is no evidence that the deceased had any connection with the charities, or that, during her lifetime, she had any particular love of, or interest in, either animals or birds.
Mrs Ilott left home whilst a teenager of 17, to live with Mr Ilott, whom she later married. Mr Ilott and Mrs Ilott have a very low income, below £5000 a year, have five children, and are entitled to state benefits. They are eligible to buy their home, under the right to buy legislation. Their schedules of expenses show a very modest standard of living.
Mrs Ilott and her mother were estranged following the departure from the family home. Although both parties contributed towards the estrangement, three attempts were made at reconciliation, but none was successful. The trial judge considered that the evidence showed Mrs Jackson having been
unreasonable, capricious and harsh
towards Mrs Ilott by excluding her from the will, but that on the facts of this case, estrangement ought not to affect the size of the amount awarded.
The latest decision concentrates on the factors to which the court should have regard when considering a claim made under the IPFDA and considers in particular the interconnection between the beneficiaries under a will, and the requirements that they might reasonably expect, and the needs of those who are closely connected to the deceased, and the financial provision *for maintenance* that might be appropriate. In this case, there was no financial need on the part of the beneficiaries of residue – as charities, this was a windfall. On the other hand, the daughter had substantial need. The fact that Mrs Ilott did not have the ability to earn much salary or any pension provision was not considered detrimental: Mrs Ilott contributed towards society, albeit in her capacity as mother to five children
while she may not have made the choices in life that her mother thought were necessary for her to make a success of her life, she has made a success of her life in other ways through being a mother and homemaker. Third, not only may it be difficult to apportion fault here but there may not have been fault on anyone’s part. Estrangement may simply have been the result of Mrs Jackson’s inability to make lasting relationships with anyone, of which there is other evidence.
The fact that Mrs Ilott was an independent adult with no disabilities who was not financially dependent on the deceased limited the award that would be given to her.
Mrs Jackson’s obligations and responsibilities to the appellant (section 3(1)(d)):
Ms Stevens-Hoare submits that the ordinary family obligation weighs to some extent in her favour under section 3(1)(d) but she accepts as she is bound to do that the fact that Mrs Jackson had no responsibility for her as an adult child living independently weighs against her.
Mrs Jackson’s testamentary wishes:
Ms Stevens-Hoare submits that the judge was wrong to pay such high regard to the deceased’s testamentary wishes. There was no other beneficiary’s needs to which the court had to pay attention. Since the trial judge had found that it was unreasonable to exclude the appellant, there had to be consideration of reasonable provision. Ms Reed submits that DJ Million was correct to have regard to the deceased’s testamentary wishes: see per Oliver J in Re Coventry dec’d  Ch 461 (“An Englishman still remains at liberty at his death to dispose of his own property in whatever way he pleases.”). In my judgment Parliament has entrusted the courts with the power to ensure, in the case of even an adult child, that reasonable financial provision is made for maintenance only. In my judgment that limitation strikes the balance with the testamentary wishes of the deceased whose estate is used for the purposes of making an award, at least in this case where there is no other claimant apart from the Charities. They have no demonstrated need or expectation.
3 Matters to which court is to have regard in exercising powers under s. 2.
(1)Where an application is made for an order under section 2 of this Act, the court shall, in determining whether the disposition of the deceased’s estate effected by his will or the law relating to intestacy, or the combination of his will and that law, is such as to make reasonable financial provision for the applicant and, if the court considers that reasonable financial provision has not been made, in determining whether and in what manner it shall exercise its powers under that section, have regard to the following matters, that is to say—
(a)the financial resources and financial needs which the applicant has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;
(b)the financial resources and financial needs which any other applicant for an order under section 2 of this Act has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;
(c)the financial resources and financial needs which any beneficiary of the estate of the deceased has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;
(d)any obligations and responsibilities which the deceased had towards any applicant for an order under the said section 2 or towards any beneficiary of the estate of the deceased;
(e)the size and nature of the net estate of the deceased;
(f)any physical or mental disability of any applicant for an order under the said section 2 or any beneficiary of the estate of the deceased;
(g)any other matter, including the conduct of the applicant or any other person, which in the circumstances of the case the court may consider relevant.